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Home » Hacking News » OpenPKG SA-2003.027: sendmail buffer overflow

OpenPKG SA-2003.027: sendmail buffer overflow

by Nikola Strahija on April 2nd, 2003 Buffer overflow vulnerability has been found in all versions of Sendmail earlier than 8.12.9, which may allow remote attackers to gain root privileges.


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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[email protected] [email protected]
OpenPKG-SA-SA-2003.027 30-Mar-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package: sendmail
Vulnerability: remote root exploit
OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= sendmail-8.12.8-20030328 >= sendmail-8.12.9-20030329
OpenPKG 1.2 <= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.1 >= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2
OpenPKG 1.1 none N.A.

Dependent Packages: none

Description:
Michal Zalewski discovered [1] a confirmed [2] buffer overflow
vulnerability in all version of the Sendmail [0] MTA earlier than
8.12.9. The mail address parser performs insufficient bounds checking
in certain conditions due to a "char" to "int" data type conversion,
making it possible for an attacker to take control of the application.
Attackers may remotely exploit this vulnerability to gain "root"
access of any vulnerable Sendmail server. The Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0161 [3] to the
problem.

Please check whether you are affected by running "/bin/rpm
-q sendmail". If you have the "sendmail" package installed and its
version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
upgrade it (see Solution). [4][5]

Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7] or a mirror location,
verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [4]
and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [5].
For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following operations
to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust
accordingly).

$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
ftp> get sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ /bin/rpm -v --checksig sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
$ /bin/rpm --rebuild sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
$ su -
# /bin/rpm -Fvh /RPM/PKG/sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
[0] http://www.sendmail.org/
[1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-March/008973.html
[2] http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/316760/2003-03-26/2003-04-01/0
[3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0161
[4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
[8] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG " (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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